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Remarks of James E. Denny before the
Study Group on Legal Remedies
Commission ca n Government Procurement
February 17, 1971
Washington, D.C.
My name is James Denny and I am a patent Attorney with
f	 ^•
the office of General Counsel, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration. I have been involved in the consideration of
privately-owned patent rights in the government procurement
process for over ten years, within three different government
agencies, and from both an operations and a policy point-of-
view. My purpose in appearing before this Study Group is to
place before the Commission the present legal and policy con-
siderations given to privately-owned patents during the pro-
curement process, and the legal remedies presently available
to patent owners whose patent rights have been used by, or on
Lehalf of, the United States Government without authority. I
would also like to review several recommendations that have
,ieen made in this area, and to suggest a series of recommenda•-
ons which , personally, belieie would equitably balance
t-P interests of the patent owner, the procuring government
agency, and the general public.
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Remedies Presently Available
It may be advantageous to first review how privately-
owned patents may be considered during the procurement process
in order to a-t ►oid government liability for patent infringement.
When an agency is preparing to procure a patented item or service,
and it comes to their attention that Uic procurement will
infringe privatel y-cw-ned U.S. patent rights, one obvious solu-
tion is to negotiate the procurement with the patent owner.
Needless to say, this is the solution most preferred by patent
owners, but it is also a solution which causes some problems
with the concept of maximum competition in government procure-
ment. On balance, however, I believe that it would be advan-
tageous if a government agency, although not required, would
have the flexibility to negotiate a procurement with a patent
owner if, taking all circumstances into consideration, it
appeared that such action was in the best interest of the public
and the procuring agency.
This was the very position government agencies were in
prior.to 1958. The Comptroller General had stated his approval
of this position_ in several decisions. For example, in his
decision of January 10, 1944, to the Switlik Parachute Company,1'
I/B-77783 (January 10, 1944)
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he considered it to be "sound practice" for an agency to
consider infringement liability in awarding a contract, and
that a bid submitted by a patent owner, although not the
lowest bid, may be the moat advanr - "% geous to the United States.
This policy had little effect on the concept of competitive
bidding because it was only applicable where it was known, in
advance, that (1) a valid patent existed, (2) the procurement
would infringe this patent, and (3) either the patent owner
or a licensee was interested in bidding on the procurement.
And even where all of these conditions were met, the agency
still had full discretion to determine the bid or proposal
most advantageous to the United States, price and other factors
considered. Accordingly, if the price submitted by the patent
owner was way out-of-line, the low bidder could be selected.
This policy had the advantages of providing support and respect
to the United States patent system, avoiding future government
liability for patent infringement, and providing a slight advan-
tage in the procurement process to those who had invested in
research and de,.clopment in areas which were found to be of
interest to the Jovernment.
1
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This policy was changed, however, by a series of
decisions by the Comptroller General beginning with the
Herbert Cooper decision in 1958. 11
 The policy change was
based primarily on the fact that (1) Section 1498 of Title 28,
United States Code, provided a remedy to a patent owner and
(2) as infringement and liability therefor are speculative,
they are not proper considerations to be used in evaluating
bids or proposals. Under this policy, therefore, we have a
situation where those who have invested in research and develop-
ment in areas of interest to the United States Government and
who utilized the United States patent system to protect the
inventive results of this research, and those who had respected
these rights by acquiring licenses to practice patented inven-
tions, found themselves at a disadvantage in competing for con-
tracts with the same Government which issued the patent right.
The owner can be expected to have a higher price in order to
recoup his research and development investment. The licensee
must add to his costs the royalties that will be paid to the
patent owner. All other considerations being equal, under the
present policy, it will be the patent infringer who obtains the
contrect, the much-needed business, and the profit -- while the
patent owner obtains the right to sue the Government.
^I.
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2/ B-136916 (Aug. 25, 1958). 38 Comp. Gen. 276
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In an attempt to partially alleviate this situation,
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration developed
a policy called the "Preprocurement License Policy." This
policy was designed to allow NASA to enter into a patent
license agreement, prior to the contract award, where
certain very strict conditions are met. Under this policy,
the Government's infringement liability would no longer be
a matter of speculation because it would be defined in the
license agreement. The amount of royalties payable under the
agreement would be added to the bid or proposal price of any
i	 unlicensed bidder, but not to the bid or proposal price of
the patent owner or his licensees. With the bids or proposals
so adjusted, the award would be given to the low bidder. If
this happened to be the patent owner or one of his licensees,
no infringing liability would occur. On the other hand, if
the low bidder was unlicensed, then the patent owner would
receive the royalties due him under the license agreement.
This policy has the advantages of respecting patent ,rights
during the procurement process, placing the patent owner and
his licensees on at least an even basis with an infringing
supplier, and eliminating future disputes concerning infringement
liability where infringing suppliers are selected.
- 6 -
This new policy was considered as having only limited
utility because NASA required all of the following conditions
to be met prior to applying the policy:
1. the patent owner must call the patent involved to
NASA's attention and identify the proposed procurement which
he alleges would infringe his patent;
2. NASA must determine that the patent will, in fact,
be infringed by the proposed procurement;
3. the statutory presumption of patent validity must
be strengthened by a court decision or by the fact that the
patent is respected commercially;
4. the patent owner must be willing to enter into a
standard license agreement prior to the award of the contract
on a reasonable royalty basis; and
5. NASA must determine that all of the above can be
accomplished without unduly delaying tre procurement.
NASA undertook this policy on an experimental basis in
1966 with the approval of the Comptroller General. al'I As we
anticipated, limited use was made of the policy because of
the R&D nature of NASA's procurement which affords little
opportunity to make advance determinations of patent infringement.
3^ B-136916 (Sept. 12, 1966) 46 Comp. Gen. 206
-A
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However, the experience that was gained indicated that there
were a few situations where the policy could be useful and that
application of the policy did not create substantial problems.
After making minor modifications, the policy was permanently
adopted by NASA,	 again with the approval of the Comptroller
Genera 1. ^'
In reviewing government policy for considering patents in
the procurement process, some mention should be made of the
patent indemnity clause. This clause, used extensively by
the Department of Defense in situations calling for formally
advertised procurements (as opposed to R&D contracts), provides
that the contractor will reimburse the Government for patent
infringement liability resulting from contract performance.
It has been suggested that the use of this clause provides an
advantage for patent owners because the patent owner does not
have to include a contingency cost for patent infringement in
his bid or proposal. This is true, of course, only In regard
to the patent owner's own patents, but not with respect. to
patents owned by others which may cover any and every phase of
the item or system to be supplied. In addition, there is little
4/ Section 9.102, NASA Procurement Regulations
l^ 9- 136916 (May 28, 1970)
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evidence that would show that bidders on government contracts
either do or do not include contingency costs for patent
infringement liability. To include such a cost in highly
competitive procurement situations might be questionable in
view of :he well-known inability or unwillingness of the
Government to enforce its rights under an indemnity clause.
After the procurement process, that is, after the contract
has been awarded to someone other than the patent owner or one
	 ^--
r
of his licensees, the patent owner always has the remedy of
a suit for unauthorized use of his patented invention in the
United States Court of Claims under 28 U.S.C. 1498(a). This
statute has been construed as giving the Government the right
to use any United States patent under its power and eminent
domain -- leaving the patent owner with a suit against the
If
Government for reasonable compensation as his exclusive and
entire remedy. The statute applies whether the infringement
is committed directly by the Government or indirectly by a
government contractor with the authorization or consent of the
Government. The patent owner has no injunctive remedy as lie
would against a private infringer. Although there are other
statutes which permit patent owners to sue the Government in
•,.h
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certain limited situations,— / 28 U.S.C. 1498(a) is the patent
owner's primary remedy in the federal courts. In many
instances, a remedy of a suit against the Government for
"reasonable compensation" -- normally considered to be a
reasonable royalty -- is not an adequate remedy. Such suits
are expensive and time-consuming, and may be beyond the resources
of many small businesses or may cost more than the infringement
liability would be worth. Also, many companies do not avail
themselves of this remedy, as they are reluctant to sue the
Government wnich they consider one of their best customers.
A complementary remedy for patent infringement is attempt-
inq to settle the infringement liability administratively with
those agencies which have the authority to enter into settlement
or license agreements. The Department of Defense, the Atomic
Energy Commission, and the National Aeronautics and Space Admini-
stration have general authorization to settle claims admini-
stratively; 7 all government agencies have settlement authoriza-
tion in certain types of situations; 8 and some agencies have
6-/ By way of example, for infringement resulting from assistance
to other countries, 22 U.S.C. 2356; for damages for use of patent
applications placed under secrecy order, 35 U.S.C. 183; for
infringement by TVA, 16 U.S.C. 831 (r).
_// 10 U.S.C. 2386 for DOD; 42 U.S.C. 2201(g) for AEC; 42 U.S.C.
2473 (b) (3) for NASA.
B/Examples include 22 U.S.C. 2356 and 35 U.S.C. 183
r
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authorization in relation to certain Government programs.9
In general, administrative settlement provides a more inexp,-.:ve,
informal, and sometimes more rapid remedy for the oatent owner
than it obtainable in the federal courts.
Solutions Previously Recommended
In recent years ; there have been numerous partial and
reportedly total solutions to the problem of considering patents
during the procurement process, or for providing remedies for
the patent owner in cases of infringement. Most of these have
been in the form of proposed legislation submitted to Congress
in the form of a bill. One of the most drastic recommendati, is
was a proposal to amend 28 U.S.C. 1498(a) to make this section
applicable only upon a determination by the Secretary of Defense
that the national security of the United States reauir.ed the
unauthorized use or manufacture of a specifically identified
patented invention. This proposal was contained in the Williams
Bill, S. 1047, introduced in the first session of the 89th Congress
in 1965. 10 Senator McClellan's Subcommittee on Patents, Trade-
marks and Copyrights, Committee on the Judiciary, held hearings
Examples include 22 U.S.C. 2356 and 35 U.S.C. 183.
10/ The identical bill was introduced by Senat-r Williams in the
first session of the 90th Congress (1967) as S. 731; also by Con-
gressman Roudebush of Indiana in the House during the 37th, 86Th
and 89th Congresses (HR 150, 89th Cong. ) In the 89th CcngLoss
16 similar bills were introduced into the House.
•
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on this as well as several other bills directed generally
to government patent policy in 1965. The primary support
for this Bill and the reason for its submission to Congress
waa duo to the fact that thv Department of Defense and the
Veterans Administration had purchased large quantities of
prescription drugs from unlicensed foreign pharmaceutical
companies. The United States pharmaceutical industry suggested
and supported this type of legislation in an attempt to prevent
further procurements of this sort.
Although many persons supported the overall purpose of
this Bill in attempting to limit foreign procurements of drugs
patented in the United States, the language of the Williams Bill
was much too broad and did not effectively accomplish the result
it was attempting to achieve. In the first place, the Bill
presumes that patent infringement can be predicted in advance
so that it can be either approved or disapproved by app•,:opriate
government officials. This, of course, is not the case:, as most
infringements caused by government activities are not discovered
until after the fact. In addition. the language of the Williams
Bill would effectively eliminate all authority of government
agencies to infringe patents and, as a result, would permit
i
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patent owners to bring suits for injunctive relief directly
against government contractors whenever the Secretary of
Defense did not certify that utilization of the particular
invention was required in the national security. And finally,	 I'
in revoking the authority of the Government to utilize patented
inventions, this Bill similarly would revoke the jurisdictional
authority of the Court of Claims to award compensation for
government use of patented inventions. As a result, the patent
owner's only remedy would be against either the government con-
tractor or against the government employee as an individual.
Accordingly, the Williams Bill received only limited support
from industry and no support whatsoever from within the Government.
Other suggestions for the amendment of 28 U.S.C. 1498 (a)
have not been so drastic, and would merely provide patent owners i
the alternative of suing the Government in the Court of Claims
or suing the government contractor for "reasonable compensation
and/or damages" in the United States District Courts. An
example of this type of recommendation is HR 5182 submitted by
Congressman Corman in the first session of the 0.1st Congress in
January 1969. The effect of this type of legislation would have
far less devastating effect on the government procurement process
6F
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than would the Williams Bill discussed above. The Department'.
of Defense, in testimony before Congress, ll
 has provided support
for legislation of this general type, but would allow suit
against the government contractor only when the contractor has
indemnified the Government and has refused to settle a claim
which the Government believes to have merit.
The Atomic Energy Commission has attempted yet another
approach to allow the patent owner direct action against the
government contractor for patent infringement. 28 U.S.C. 1498(a)
authorizes infringement by a government contractor only when such
action has been performed with the "authorization or consent"
of the Government. Accordingly, the Atomic Energy Commission
in one case attempted to prevent the application of 28 U.S.C.
1498(a) by including in the contract a clause which specifically
withheld the Government's authorization or consent to use the
particular patents involved. The Comptroller General, however,
stated ti)at specifically withholding the Government's authoriza-
Lion and consent when the Commission intended to accept articles
which may embodythe patented inventions or which away be made
11/
Hearings on S. 1047 before the Subcommittee on Patents,
Trademarks and Copyrights, Senate Subcommittee on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. at 71.
c
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with the patented processes was contrary to the legislative
intent and the prior case law which brought about the insertion
of the phrase "authorization or consent" in 28 U.S.C. 1498.12 	 i
Representative Morris of New Mexico proposed what I
believe to be the most direct and useful approach to considering
patents in the procurement process in H.R. 10022, introduced in
the first session of the 89th Congress in July 1965. Basically,
this Bill would amend the Federal Property and Administrative
Services Act and the Armed Services Procurement Act to permit
an agency to negotiate with a patent owner or his licensee in
the event that the agency head determines that a valid infringe-
ment claim would likely result if the purchase was made from an
infringing supplier. The effect of this proposed amendment
would be to place the agencies in the exact position that they
were in prior to the Comptroller General's 1958 Herbert Cooper
decision. This proposal would appear to have substantial
support from industry and from many government -agencies.
There were some who believed that such a proposal would
r
be sufficiently broad as to virtually eliminate competition in
a c>>bstantial number of procurements. This would not be the case,
i2/ B-159356 (Sept. 20, 1966)
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however, as the amendment did not require an agency to
negotiate in such circumstances, but merely permit it. This
authority tc negotiate would not receive wide application
because, as previously stated, most infringements are not
discovered until after the fact, and negotiations would only
be considered (1) if a determination could be made before the
procurement that performance under the proposed contract weu ld
result in an infringement of a valid patent, and (2) where the
patent ovmer or one of his licensees were among the bidders or
proposers.
Perhaps because of the lack of wide support to his sug-
gestion set forth in H.R. 10022, Representative Morris suggested
a different approach in the first session of the 90th Congress
in H.R. 2898 (January 1967). This proposal suggested amending
r
the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act and the
Armed Services Procurement Act in a manner that would provide
for a procedure basically the same as NASA's F'-eprocurement
Licensing Policy. The Bill provided for entering into a
licensing agreement prior to award of a contract, and the
consideration of the royalties payable under the agreement in
determining which bid or offer would be the most advantageous
to the United States, price and other factors considered.
I6
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Although hearings were not held on either of the Morris Bills,
it is my understanding that all government agencies were
requested to comment on both these Bills by the House Committee
on Government Operations. I know that NASA supported both Bills,
but the opinions of the various government agencies, to my know- f
ledge, have not been published. For further information in this
.4
regard, I would assume that inquiry could be made to the Office
of Budget and Management.
Senator Saltonstall suggested a different approach by
providing wider authority to the government agencies to admini-
stratively settle infringement claims, rather than expanding the
Government's authority to consider patents at the time of procure-
ment. This proposal was made in S. 789, introduced in the first
session of the 89th Ccongress (April 1965). This Bill was primarily
intended to recommend a government-wide patent policy but included
in Section 9 thereof authority for the head of each government
agency to administratively settle patent infringement claims.
The general concept of providing authority to all agencies to
administratively settle infringement claims received widespread
support. Under the Saltonstall Bill, however, the agency determi-
nation was to be made under the formal requirements of the Admini-
strative Procedures Act from which an appeal could be taken to
F--
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the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals. On this point, there was
diversity of opinion, and at leat two agencies (NASA and the
Department of Defense) specifically recommended against such
formality in the administrative consideration of patent infringe-
ment.13
An alternative approach to providing all agencies with
authority to administratively settle patent infringement claims
has been recommended several times by many organizations. In
1960, when 28 U.S.C. 1498 was amen:-led to provide for suits
against the United States Government for copyright infringement
by or on behalf of the United States (28 U.S.C. 1498(b)), lan-
guage was inserted that permitted the head of each government
department or agency to administratively settle the allegation
of infringement prior to the time that suit was filed in the
Court of Claims. It would appear to be a. simple matter to make
this type of amendment to paragraph (a) of 28 U.S.C. 1498,
thereby permitting all agencies to settle patent infringement
claims as well.
13/ Hearings on S. 789, S. 1809 and S. 1891 before the Sub-
committee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights, Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., Part I at 75; and
Hearings on S. 1047 at 14.
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Multiple Solations Necessary
I know that it is the stated policy of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration to encourage the private
sector or our economy to invest in research and development
activities in areas of specific interest to NASA. I believe
that this is also the policy of the Department of Defense, and
I would assume it to be the policy of most other government
agencies as well. If this is true,then it would appear incumbent
upon the Government to design its policies regarding consideration
of patent tights in the procurement process such that it would
foster private industry to present to the Government the results
of their most recent, privately developed technology. Accord-
ingly, whenever possible, privately developed patent rights
should be favorably considered in the procurement process and
the owners of such rights should be placed in an advantageous
position, insofar as it is possible to do so in consideration
with cther procurement policies -- particularly the policy of
obtaining maximum competition in government procurement.
I believe, therefore, that the concept set forth by
Representative Morris in H.R. 10022 should be accepted and our
procurement laws amended accordingly. This proposed amendment
01
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does not require negotiations with a patent owner, but merely
permits an agency to enter into such negotiations in appro-
priate circumstances. Where, for example, the parent owner's
bid is not substantially more than that of an infringing bidder,
where future patent infringing liability can be eliminated and,
because of his prior -research where the patent owner will be
in the best position to supply the item and proprietary technical
information concerning it, negotiations would appear to be in
the best public interest. On the other hand, such negotiating
authority must not be required, so as to permit patent owners
complete control over government procurement of patented items,
and to charge prices which may have no relationship to a reason-
able profit or royalty.
Also, there will be highly competitive situations where
both the patent owner and one or more of his licensees under
the patent will be available bidders. In such situations, it
would appear that a procedure on the order of NASA's Preprocure-
ment License Policy would be the best overall method to use to
maintain competition, while at the sane time, give consideration
to the patent rights involved. Accordingly, I would suggest
i
i^
that the second Morris Bill, H.R. 2898, is complementary to,
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and not a substitution for, H.R. 10022. These two Bills
would provide the government agencies with adequate flexibility
to consider patent rights during the procurement process.
In addition, it is recommended that each government
agency have full authority to consider and administratively
settle claims of patent infringement before suit is brought
against the Government. This can be most easily accomplished
by amending 28 U.S.C. 1498(a) to give the agency this authority
in the same manner as paragraph (b) of this statute provides
agencies with the authority to settle for copyright infringement.
And finally, for complete flexibility, I would recommend
that the agencies be given some authority- for permitting a
patent owner to proceed directly against the infringing con-
tractor where the agency believes that this is in the best
interest of the Government. There are situations, for example,
where large-scala, continuing procurements are made of items
covered b^ valid patents which are respected throughout the
majority of industry. Some companies, however, will refuse to
respect such patent rights when they are working under government
contracts because they cannot be charged directly with infringe-
ment. In such situations, it would be advantageous to specifi-
cally withhold the Government's authorization dnd consent to
infringe the specific patents involved. Accordingly, I would
,
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suggest that 28 U.S.C. 1498(a) be amended to make it clear
that government agencies may specifically withh jld authori-
zation and .consen' throu-th appropriate contract clauses.
With the combination of authorizations suggested above,
I believe that the agencies wili then have a sufficiently
diverse set of tools which will permit them to react in any
particular contracting situation in a manner most likely to
obtain an equitable balance between the interests of the patent
owner, the interests of the agencies involved, and the interests
of the general public in maintaining an effective government
procurement process.
I would like to add just two additional thoughts. The
first is that although all of my comments above have been
directed to privately-owned patent rights, for the most part,
they are equally applicable to privately-owned and privately-
developed copyrights and proprietary data. In this regard,
therefore. I would suggest that the agencies be given the same
range of authorization whenever these types of intellectual
property are involved. Finally, most of the comments made in
this presentation are covered in greater detail and are better
documented in an article entitled, "Patent Infringemen^s in
Government Procurement: A Remedy Without a Right?" which appeared
I
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in the Notre Dame sawyer., Volume 42, No. 1, October 1966.
I
This article was authored by Mr. Gerald J. Mossinghoff,
presently with NASA, and Mr. Robert F. Allnutt, who is now
associated with she Procurement Commission.
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